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McLaughlin, J. and Clavering, E.K. (2011) Questions of Kinship and Inheritance in Pediatric 
Genetics: Substance and Responsibility. New Genetics and Society , 30(4), 399-413 
 
Abstract 
Pediatric genetics is a growing in significance as a tool to explain childhood illness and 
disability. Within both medical sociology and anthropology writers have begun to consider 
what significance this may have, if any, on understandings of kinship and genetic inheritance. 
This paper explores this question via ethnographic research (funded by the Economic and 
Social Research Council) we are carrying out in a genetics service in the UK. In particular we 
explore how understandings of kinship can be unsettled by genetic scrutiny, while stressing 
that this is not reliant on genetic testing identifying an inherited genetic fault. We discuss how 
genetics becomes incorporated into kinship understandings of both substance and 
responsibility and the significance of broader social and cultural understandings of these 
concepts to the meanings given to genetics.  
 
 
Key words: pediatric genetics; kinship  
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Questions of Inheritance in Pediatric Genetics: Substance and Responsibility 
Introduction 
In the UK children with developmental differences and complex health problems are 
increasingly likely to come into contact with genetic services as part of explorations of what 
may lie behind their difficulties (Department of Health 2003). The rise in referrals is linked to 
a number of factors including new techniques for identifying smaller and smaller 
chromosomal variations. Identification of a genetic syndrome in a young child occurs through 
a combination of diagnostic techniques, in particular the scientific discipline of 
dysmorphology – the visual analysis of a child aimed at identifying ‘abnormal’ physical 
features, which can be symptomatic of an underlying genetic fault. Dysmorphology is 
combined with exploration of family history, including the production of family trees or 
pedigrees. Family history is explored because a syndrome can be passed down from either or 
both biological parents. However the syndrome can also be a product of a new ‘mutation’ 
(referred to as a de novo mutation) to the child’s DNA that occurs at or after egg fertilization. 
If the child’s physical characteristics point towards a specific syndrome or variations within 
certain chromosomes then molecular genetic testing may take place.  
From within both medical sociology and medical anthropology there is some debate 
about whether genetic explorations such as this can alter people’s understanding of their 
kinship relationships. In this paper we wish to argue that even when pediatric genetics finds 
no genetic explanation for a child’s differences, or identifies a de novo mutation, questions 
around kinship remain central. Drawing from sociological work on pediatric genetics, 
anthropological work on kinship, and our own research in a genetics clinic, we explore how 
the moral worth of kinship relations are unsettled, whether the cause of difference is located 
within inherited traits or not. By moral worth we refer to the ways in which particular kinship 
relationships are recognized as acceptable forms of intimate life by the family itself and by 
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others (Skeggs 1997). Such recognitions are influenced by cultural and social norms about 
what family should constitute. These normative values are shaped by and through social 
factors associated with gender, class, race and ethnicity, disability, sexuality and others 
(Sayer 2005). In particular, we explore two defining factors that establish the moral worth of 
kinship: substance and responsibility.  
The paper begins by establishing what current sociological and anthropological work 
has to say about the possible connections between pediatric genetics and kinship, substance 
and kinship, and responsibility and kinship. We then move on to our own study, after briefly 
summarizing the research approach. We then highlight how the possibility of an inherited 
trait does lead to varied interrogations around the nature of kinship and connection, however, 
the rest of the paper focuses on how such interrogations continue even when inheritance is 
unclear or ruled out. Our primary argument is that: a) people’s understanding of the genetic 
substance of their kinship connections, and therefore a cornerstone of their moral worth, can 
be challenged by the emergence of a mutation into the family line, particularly as they look to 
the future; and b) conversely a mutation can offer a family some protection from other 
challenges to their moral worth - such as the stigmatized label of irresponsible mother - by 
providing the alternative explanation of random bad luck.  
 
Pediatric genetics, kinship, substance and responsibility 
There is a small, but growing, body of research within sociology and anthropology exploring 
pediatric genetics. Of particular significance is research examining diagnosis by writers such 
as Atkinson, Featherstone, Latimer and Shaw. This work has explored how clinical authority 
is exercised within consultations with families (Featherstone et al. 2005), how 
dysmorphology represents a form of craft expertise in medicine (Shaw 2003), and how 
families respond to such clinical dynamics and materializations of their child (Latimer 2007; 
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Featherstone et al. 2006a). The work also considers what the implications are for the families 
themselves. On the one hand it is argued that over time parents can be incorporated into the 
medical process, as they too begin to read their children via the representations and categories 
of genetics. Genetic diagnosis becomes the explanatory framework through which, ‘what is 
abnormal or unusual about the child’ (Latimer 2007: 106) is understood. Alternatively 
Featherstone et al. argue that an important aspect of the ‘moral work’ of the genetics clinic is 
‘repairing the perceptions of identity of the child and the family’ (Featherstone et al. 2006b: 
110), which are created by societal prejudice towards people who look and are seen as 
different due to disability or illness. They argue that in the genetics clinic social shame and 
stigma is replaced by admiration for the child’s development and distinctiveness. 
One of the key questions explored within the work above is whether pediatric genetics 
produces new or altered understandings of kinship relations: 
The identification of an inherited, genetically-based medical condition has a potential 
impact on social relationships of family and kinship; inherited medical problems can 
place in question the moral worth of parents; the diagnosis of a genetic condition can 
place in hazard the identity of a child. (Featherstone et al. 2006b: 101)  
What Featherstone et al. tap in to here is the view that, because genetics opens up the 
possibility that the child’s problems could have been transferred to them via their parents’ 
DNA, this form of medicine has particular implications for people’s understanding of 
inheritance. Genetics presupposes that what a family shares is ‘molecular’ (Edwards 2005) 
or, as Strathern explains, ‘persons are literally and genetically composed of kinship substance 
in his or her body’ (1992: 78). If that shared molecular substance includes a ‘faulty gene’, 
then what family trees capture is a representation of a ‘collective, diseased body and they 
become a visual image of the family disease’ (Edwards 2005: 27). Faced with such 
pathological symbols of who they are, families can and do resist via their existing 
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understandings of kinship connection (Fitzgerald 2008). What this implies is the co-existence 
of cultural and scientific versions of kinship, a theme explored within kinship studies in 
anthropology (Carsten 2000; Franklin & McKinnon 2001b).  
Much of the current anthropological work on kinship begins with the assertion that ‘it 
is fiction that kinship ever constituted some kind of intransigent rock on which more 
malleable and dynamic forms of sociality were superimposed’ (Carsten 2004: 186). Kinship 
has always been something that had to be secured in social and cultural values and 
understandings, rather than being an entity in itself, produced by nature and biology, upon 
which social and scientific innovation has imposed change. Kinship, rooted in biology, is 
itself a cultural vision of what family is. What it produces is a belief that some forms of 
family are innately natural and subsequently in less need of moral scrutiny and defense. 
Carsten (2004) highlights how biology itself is a socially produced set of cultural values and 
knowledge claims. In particular, she draws from Schneider’s (1968) argument that kinship is 
culturally secured in various ‘substances’ such as blood and semen. Substance can be framed 
in multiple ways in order to serve particular articulations of kinship relationship and enable 
certain claims for the moral worth of kinship relations to be made and recognized. In the 
context of contemporary interest in the genetics of kinship, DNA becomes the biological 
substance holding kinship together. However, claims to genetic materials being a ‘core’ 
biological substance of kinship still have to be made culturally meaningful through a 
‘complex choreography between social and biological factors’ (Carsten 2004: 179). As 
Franklin and McKinnon argue the same substance, whether that be blood or genes, 
‘mobilized to create kinship ties in one context, will in different institutional contexts… be 
made to create other kinds of relations, or no relation at all’(2001a: 13). From this vantage 
point genetics can be thought of as a cultural tool in emphasizing ‘the naturalness of 
biological kinship’ (Strathern 1992: 53). 
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The moral worth of a family is also closely articulated through how family members 
carry out and understand their core responsibilities. Strathern (1992) argues that the belief 
that family equates to responsibility has, if anything, heightened in the late twentieth century. 
For example, there are a range of responsibilities parents articulate as theirs in terms of 
raising children to be good citizens, and to provide nurturing environments. Ribbens 
McCarthy et al. argue that ‘the moral imperative around taking responsibility for putting 
children’s needs first may be one of the few remaining unquestionable moral assertions’ 
(2000: 800). Familial responsibilities are often articulated as ‘looking after your own’. Such 
articulations, however, are embedded in complex understandings of who ‘your own’ are 
(Edwards & Strathern 2000). How this is defined is informed by lived experiences of 
connection and closeness, which mean that those biologically close may be socially distant 
and vice versa. Ribbens McCarthy et al. (2000), Jamieson (1998) and Smart and Neal (1998) 
all argue that establishing the morally justifiable boundaries around responsibility has 
become more difficult in contemporary contexts of varied family forms and relationships. 
The conceptualization and allocation of responsibilities within changing versions of family is 
an ongoing process of negotiation, framed as obligation, but actually the product of many 
material and social contingencies, influenced by factors such as gender and class (Innes & 
McKie 2006; Finch & Mason 1991; Finch & Mason 1993). In the day-to-day negotiations of 
family life, influenced by responsibility discourses and the need to present a moral version of 
the good family, people produce and re-produce complex and varied understandings of 
responsibility.  
How can pediatric genetics be linked to the significance of substance and 
responsibility in how kin can establish moral worth? As Featherstone et al. (2006b) proposed 
above, if a child’s problems are associated with an inherited genetic syndrome, this can place 
the purity of the genetic substance that kin relations share under new scrutiny. Equally, what 
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responsibility should parents bare for passing on such impurity down the family line? If 
genetics is framed as a core substance of kinship, and that substance is found wanting, are 
parents responsible for producing faulty children and molecular connections? As discussed 
earlier there are two ways in which it could be argued that the work of pediatric genetics 
actually means very little for kinship. First, a significant number of children will go through 
the doors of genetics clinics and out the other side without having any syndrome identified. 
Second, it is fairly common for the clinics to find a new mutation to the genetic make-up of 
the child, which has no link to the parents, or past members of the family. In both scenarios it 
could be argued that kinship remains unaffected by genetic investigation. However, what this 
paper seeks to argue is that an inherited genetic trait does not need to be found for the moral 
worth of kinship relations to be placed under scrutiny.  
 
Methodological approach 
This article is based on data emerging from fieldwork with 17 families with a child newly 
referred to a genetic service in the UK.12
                                                 
1 Project details removed at this stage of the review process 
 Our methodological approach follows each family 
over time (up to 18 months), going with them into the different settings of their lives and 
listening to the perspectives of multiple actors within the family, including parents, siblings, 
and other significant family members (who are not necessarily blood related). This occurs via 
a mix of qualitative longitudinal interviews and non-participant observation in clinical and 
non clinical encounters. Recruitment was organized through letters of invitation sent via the 
genetics service. We have put in place a number of measures to ensure that the clinic is not 
aware which families go forward to be full participants in the study. This includes carrying 
out observations in the clinics with families who have agreed to be ‘non-participants’, so that 
2 To capture a retrospective perspective, the second stage of the fieldwork aims to do in-depth interviews with 
other families (including parents, siblings, significant family and friends, and the children themselves) who have 
at least 3 years’ break from being last seen by the paediatric genetic service and can, therefore offer a 
retrospective perspective on their experiences. 
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the clinic do not know which consultations and therefore which families are included in the 
analysis and writing up of data. The project obtained ethical approval via the Local Research 
Ethics Committee of the NHS National Research Ethics Service. In the discussion below we 
give the families fictional names and identify the kinship relationship to the child referred to 
the genetics service of all participants present in the interview.  
The families in the study are from across the north of England; an area associated 
with significant pockets of socio-economic deprivation, and a predominately fairly stable 
white, working class population, with continued patterns of strong kinship ties. This 
background is reflected in the lives of the families - the majority (n14) defined themselves as 
working class, several (n7) were located in dispersed ex-mining villages or semi-rural 
locations across the region, while all families lived close to or had strong connections to 
extended kin. Analysis is based on transcripts of anonymous interviews and the detailed notes 
of clinic observations. Via independent analysis of transcripts and notes and then shared 
coding across the team, a theoretically influenced coding frame has been developed, which is 
then applied to the transcripts. This paper concentrates on one of the themes that have 
emerged around questions of how the moral worth of kinship (finding inheritance, the 
substance of kinship, and the responsibility of kinship) were framed alongside the families' 
experiences of first consultations.  
 
Finding inheritance 
The possibility of genetics producing particular frames of biomedical kinship is easiest to see 
when the belief is that the child has inherited a genetic variation from one or both parents. For 
example, in one family in our study the geneticists were exploring the possibility of a 
syndrome that can only be passed on by the mother, in the process of this being established, 
the father felt his connection to his child had been erased: 
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Dave: They did like a little family tree of like how many brothers and sisters Donna 
had got, and Margaret had got, and ages and all that... I said to you [Donna] I was 
getting annoyed, ‘cos they only did you two [Donna and Margaret], they didn’t 
actually ask any questions about my family and my brother’s and sister’s heights and 
that.  But you said it is just because it was your genes… 
Donna: Because it comes from me, so they wanted to know my family history and 
things like that. 
Researcher [to Dave]: When you say annoyed, why did you feel annoyed, if you don’t 
mind me asking? 
Dave: Well they was doing their family tree, I wasn’t even on it. 
(Henderson-Smith Family, Interview 1, Donna (Mother), Dave (Father), Margaret 
(Maternal Grandmother)) 
The drawing of the tree without the father’s inclusion implied that his biological relationship 
to his daughter was of less significance than that of the mother and her side of the family. He 
was aware of the medical basis for this emphasis, but that was not necessarily enough to 
reassure him. This was because this feeling of detachment was not just a product of genetics. 
As Strathern (1992) points out, paternity is the easiest connection to erase given the 
significance of the mother’s body to pregnancy and birth. Paternity is something which has to 
be made visible. The sense of erasure the father felt was connected to an existing dislocation 
he felt by being from another part of the country and therefore an incomer to an existing 
located kinship network. At various points he described himself as a ‘foreigner’, and here 
genetics further produced this sense of non-belonging. The social and biological came 
together to imply his presence within the family was less rooted and less important to the 
child’s character and future.  
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There is an echo here to studies of families who share genetic traits that heighten their 
risk of cancer. Such studies suggest that being told you do not share a genetic trait, even one 
that puts you at risk of various illnesses, is not always experienced as a positive outcome 
(Haites & Matthews 2005; Cox & McKellin 1999; Sanders et al. 2003). Instead the person 
can feel that they have lost a connection to others in the family. Likewise the father here 
experienced a feeling of distance rather than relief, because he did not share something with 
his daughter that she has with the maternal side of the family. For this reason he worked to 
remake the connection to the child. One visual symbol of the syndrome that the daughter has 
is short stature. In the interview Dave commented, “I mean I am not the tallest of people.” 
While the genetics consultant asserted that her stature was related to a syndrome that can only 
be passed on by the mother, the father found a way to bring himself back into the explanation 
via this shared characteristic. The father’s sense of distance from the family and his route 
back in is through a combination of both social and biological ties.  He did so because of the 
moral importance he placed on feeling he belongs and is responsible for shaping the child’s 
character, identity and future. 
In contrast to the work people have to do when genetic inheritance is thought to be the 
root of a syndrome (as it was for the Henderson-Smith Family), the conclusion that a 
syndrome is likely to be a new mutation can be a source of comfort to existing familial 
understandings of the substance of kinship ties: 
Anne: But I think the most useful point was, I think this, as [the geneticist] said, ‘I 
think it is extremely unlikely that it would be related in any of your other members of 
your family.’ And that was a huge relief. Erm I don’t know why but I felt hugely 
guilty and responsible, and I know it doesn’t make any sense, but when the geneticist 
said, ‘this isn’t going, this is unlikely to have any impact on the rest of the family,’ 
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that took a huge weight off my shoulders, like this was my fault you know, have I sort 
of introduced some form of noxious chemical into the family? 
(Flynn Family, Interview 1, Anne (Mother) and Matt (Father)) 
Anne feared that her child, whose body and development was visibly different to others in the 
family, alongside the scrutiny of genetics, had disclosed the presence of something ‘noxious’ 
within the family lineage. She was relieved that genetic investigation had been able to affirm 
the ‘purity’ of the extended family; their - and her - moral worth was re-secured.  
The sense of relief at finding the existing shared substance of kinship could not be 
blamed for the child’s health problems was one articulated by other families too: 
Kim:  I don’t like that word they use where it could be a mutant thing, I don’t like that 
phrase…. It means there’s nothing in the family history to say, I’ve been looking on 
the internet, there’s nothing in the family history to say if there’s a problem. Like the 
‘xxxx’ syndrome, remember it said erm, ‘it can be in the family generations back, but 
then again it can just mutate.’ It would be a one off, and I hate that phrase. 
(Brown Family, Interview 1, Kim (Mother) and Ian (Father)) 
The mother’s discomfort with the language of mutation is something we will return to below. 
The relief she experienced points to the importance of the substance of the family’s biological 
ties in equating to their moral worth. 
For the Flynn Family, the sense of relief the mother felt was also tied to the 
‘permission’ it offered to reproduce the family line without significant concern. One of the 
key reasons she and her husband had gone to the genetics service was to help them decide 
whether to try for another child. They were reassured by the genetics consultant who said the 
risks of the problem happening again were low, falling below the risk percentage they had 
already decided they could handle. Their existing wish to ‘grow’ their family, a family 
without ‘noxious chemicals’ present, was supported by the assertion that a random change 
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had occurred, which bore few implications for future reproductive options for them. Such 
relief is connected to a wish to have another child who does not face the same difficulties 
their existing child has. However, there is something more going on here that points to an 
apparent incompatibility with knowingly risking bringing an ill or impaired child into the 
world and the moral worth of the families they join. Jennings (2000) and Hubbard (1997) 
argue (in relation to antennal screening), that screening demands prospective parents, in 
particular mothers, be the moral guardians of who is allowed to enter the human race. Parents 
must defend why, when they could do otherwise, they would choose to go ahead with a 
pregnancy (or in this instance to consider becoming pregnant) where risks are known. Indeed 
some bioethicists argue that such choices are morally unjustifiable because of the future 
harms and pain that may lie ahead for a child born ill or impaired (Hammond 2010; Vehmas 
2001; Green 1996). A view, of course, strongly rejected by other bioethicists and disability 
writers (Paul 2001; Murray 2002; Asch 2000). For the Flynn Family, they can go forward 
with their wish to have more children without the complexity of dealing with the potentially 
troubling terrain of justifying to others that they did the right, moral thing.  
The need to reassert the value of kinship connections is clearly evident when 
inheritance is put into question. Our emerging data also shows a variety of ways in which 
kinship still requires ‘work’ to retain social legitimacy even when genetics proposes that 
inheritance is not in question.  
 
The substance of kinship 
The claim that a genetic syndrome is a product of a de novo mutation means that something 
new has come in to the familial line and relationships. Going back to the Brown Family, we 
noted the mother’s discomfort with the language of ‘mutation’. Our most readily available 
cultural purchase on ‘mutation’ is one mediated by science fiction and blockbuster movies 
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such as the ‘X-Men’ series. These associations mean that, while genetics may use the term in 
a neutral way, its cultural value is far from neutral. Instead it brings visions of humans who 
are not quite human, who carry the mark of difference, a new version of the freak. Such 
associations trouble the place of the child within the family and the place of the family within 
the social. Here, we are drawing from Haimes (2003), who argues that children seen as 
somehow different have to have a space found for them in order to locate them within the 
web of familial relations. This is particularly so for children whose biological connection to 
others is incomplete (for example due to egg or sperm donation) or missing (due to adoption). 
In our case a new mutation distorts the biological bond between parents and child: she is not 
just a product of their genes or their nurturing, something else has intruded into their 
immediate and distant connections. The loss of biological similarity and proximity is also 
read through how the child, as a result of that mutation, can look physically different to others 
in the family and to ‘normal’ children.  
The Sprake Family’s daughter (Christina) had been linked to a syndrome which was 
associated with a variety of distinctive facial features, in particular the inability to smile. 
Below the mother (Penny) discussed realizing that a newspaper article talking about another 
little girl who could not smile was identifying the same situation Christina faced: 
I remember seeing something on the news a long time ago about a little girl who 
couldn’t smile and then when I went on [the internet] and seen it, then it registered, 
I’m sure I’ve seen something about this before… she was in the paper I remember it 
was a little girl who couldn’t smile, and all she wanted, the one thing she wanted I’m 
sure it was for Christmas, the one thing she wanted was to be able to smile, and that’s 
when I thought, well I know what they’re talking about now. 
(Sprake Family, Interview 1, Penny (Mother) and Graham (Father)) 
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The mother saw similarities between her daughter and the girl in the newspaper with the 
same syndrome, which meant that Christina looked more like ‘the little girl’, than like her 
biological family. Two things moderated Penny’s sense of loss over this: that the geneticists 
did not believe the syndrome had been inherited; and that they believed it to be a relatively 
mild version. Strathern points out that English kinship has always retained the notion that 
each child born is a unique individual – ‘we might consider the individuality of persons as the 
first act of English kinship’ (Strathern 1992: 14) – produced via the combination of the blood 
and nurture of their parents. The biological connection provides the supposed foundation to 
the child’s individuality and the continuity to past generations. For Penny, something has 
fractured that continuity and is visibly apparent through Christina’s limited ability to smile. 
This inability marked Christina as visibly different, a difference read as particularly 
significant due to the social and cultural importance of smiling as a form of embodiment 
which displays emotion and connection.  
As well as fracturing the connection to the past, a new mutation can also fracture that 
connection into the future. While the parents of a child whose differences are the product of a 
new mutation can feel that their own reproductive choices are left morally untroubled, this 
will not necessarily be the case for the child as they become adults. Parents often reflected on 
the issues their child would potentially face as an adult thinking about having their own 
children:  
Lorraine: But as a woman, to think that, well at some point I’m going to have to tell 
Alesha that it’s not going to be straightforward for her, and when she wants to have 
children she’s going to have to be involved with the Genetics [service]. And it may be 
that she can’t have children. If she can have children she might not be able to have 
perfect children, for want of a better word. For a mother to have to tell that to her 
daughter, it’s horrible, really horrible.  
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 (Rushton Family, Interview 1, Lorraine (Mother)) 
The range of concerns the mother expressed here are significant. She realized that for her 
daughter the choices and decisions around having children will be more complicated due to 
the knowledge she has this mutation, and that this will place her decisions under greater 
scrutiny by herself and others. Part of that self-scrutiny will be around whether she will want 
to bring children into the world who – like her – may not be ‘perfect’. Will she be able to 
defend this to others who may assume that the moral thing to do is not to? Left unspoken, but 
implied, is the mother’s own view about whether her daughter should bring ‘imperfect’ 
children into the world and into her family. Finally, Lorraine’s clear sadness was influenced 
by her gendered sense that these dilemmas are an intrusion in the relationship between 
mother and daughter. Instead of joyously planning grandchildren together, what lies ahead 
are complicated and morally challenging explorations of what is possible for the daughter and 
what is the ‘right’ thing to do. What makes that difficult is the recognition that with this 
mutation something about the substance of family kinship has irrevocably changed.  
 
Responsibility of kinship 
In the context of genetics, dynamics of responsibility are multiple and the questions of 
inheritance or mutation bring to the fore varied different understandings of what warrants 
claims to responsibility, blame, and what is meant by inheritance. If a trait has been inherited, 
should responsibility and blame be felt? We saw from the Flynn Family, the sense of relief 
Anne felt that she had not uncovered an impurity in the biological line of the family. 
However, this concern with the purity of genetic inheritance and attributing blame for 
spoiling the biological substance of kinship was not universally shared by others. For 
example, the Morgan Family had a history of heart problems on the paternal side which was 
thought to be inherited. However James, the father of the child being seen by the genetics 
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service (for reasons not connected to this history) did not believe that his father should feel 
guilty for passing these problems on. Genetics, rather than his father as a person, was to 
blame:  
James: I don’t think there’s no, my dad doesn’t feel guilty for passing on like loads of 
genetic traits if you know what I mean there.  It’s just that’s part of it, you know... My 
dad would just be like it’s not his fault if you know what I mean.  That’s the cause of 
the genetics, which have nothing to do with him, he was born with it himself.  
(Morgan Family, Interview 1, Jill (Mother) and James (Father)) 
For several of our families the passing on of genes was not associated with attributions of 
moral responsibility towards the person (Arribas-Ayllon, M., et al. 2008). Since this was the 
case a new mutation did not absolve issues of responsibility, as this was not where the 
dilemmas were focused. Instead the disputes over familial responsibility and inheritance lay 
within associations between moral worth and social identity and behavior.  
In our research genetics became entangled in a number of familial and social 
interrogations regarding parents’ behavior, in particular their ability to produce and raise their 
children to acceptable social standards. In such interrogations genetics was used as a vehicle 
to rebut criticism and assumptions of irresponsibility. In one family, the maternal 
grandmother had suggested that personal difficulties the mother had experienced during 
pregnancy may have contributed to the child’s problems. In response the mother pointed out 
that the geneticists did not believe that anything had happened during the pregnancy that 
contributed to the outcome: 
Jan: It’s always been in the back of me mam’s mind, has the stress I had during 
pregnancy led to it?…  So I made a point of telling her, the geneticist said that there 
was nothing that was done during the pregnancy that stunted the growth, stunted 
something that the blood supply couldn’t get to. 
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(Grace Family, Interview 1, Jan (Mother))  
Here genetic ‘bad luck’ replaces the culpability directed towards the mother for contributing 
to her child’s problems.  
The reasons why parents would use genetics to alleviate a sense of responsibility can 
be found in the socio-economic background the families taking this view. For example, some 
of the mothers in the study fit morally dubious social categories of the ‘lone mother’ (n4), or 
‘mother with children from multiple partners’ (n4). When asked to describe her class 
position, one mother, who was raising five children noted: ‘I’m classed as a single parent, 
benefit scrounger with two disabled children’ (Hardcastle Family, Interview 1, Mandy 
(Mother)). In contrast Mandy wanted to be seen as someone employed in providing expert 
care. She believed that if she was seen as ‘employed’ she, and her family, would have access 
to the rights of those in employment, she would be recognized as having skills and expertise, 
and would warrant less formal and informal scrutiny: 
I want the freedom to have the life of an employed person, without somebody 
checking every five minutes, ‘have you got anybody staying over, are you doing any 
work, are you getting money from anywhere?’  Which it’s continuously being 
investigated by the benefits system, and you always feel like you’re cheating the 
system. 
(Hardcastle Family, Interview 1, Mandy (Mother)) 
This mother, and others in questionable social positions, found that they had to challenge 
various assumptions about their mothering skills in order to have the possibility that there 
was something medically wrong with their children acknowledged:  
I had a three year battle, going through Learning Disabilities Team saying I was molly 
coddling them, there was nothing wrong with them… ‘Cos at first they said, “oh you 
just want her to be disabled.” …. All sorts of accusations come out, you know, 
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“you’re just making it up.” Or you get people in the street saying, “you’re doing it for 
the DLA [Disability Living Allowance] benefit.”  
(Hardcastle Family, Interview 1, Mandy (Mother))   
 
The mother in the Dougherty Family, another lone parent, found herself under 
considerable scrutiny by medical professionals when her baby did not gain weight:  
I kept on saying he’s not growing, he’s not putting on any weight. This was probably 
at about a year old, about eleven months, and they just kept on saying, “ah, just give 
him more calories.” … They weren’t doing anything to start with, and then it was, 
when he was like really, really, really tiny, the’ were like, “we’d better have another 
look.”’ When he was about three that was. Yeah, great that!  
(Dougherty Family, Interview 1, Jackie (Mother)) 
As Jackie explained to the geneticist at the start of the first consultation, small stature (one of 
the child’s features being examined) was associated with the maternal family’s physical 
traits. The challenge for genetics was whether a specific syndrome could be identified to 
provide an alternative explanation for why her son had neither put weight on as a baby nor 
thrived as a toddler. However, either option (family trait or de novo genetic syndrome) 
cleared the mother from blame. 
For Jackie and Mandy, genetic explanations redefine their child’s problems as 
medical and in so doing produce a counter-balance to the argument that the source lies in 
their irresponsibility. The familiarity and power of the bad mother figure - easily recognized 
and hard to refute when the mother is either young, on her own, or thought of as lower class - 
carries a stronger negative social currency and penalty than genetic inheritance. Parents are 
socially accountable for passing on the right kinds of values and characteristics to their 
children via their behavior and approach to life. The societal suspicion is that lone mothers – 
 19 
particularly those who are young and/or of a particular class - will struggle to meet this 
obligation. Edwards’s (2005) distinction between how children are both ‘made’ and ‘made-
up’ by parents, particularly mothers, is resonant here. Mothers who ‘casually’ enter either or 
both relationships and pregnancy are seen as responsible for producing problematic offspring. 
If their child is ill or disabled it is easy in such contexts to associate that illness or disability 
with the mother’s lack of moral worth. In such contexts, genetic science, as a form of 
recognized medical authority, can be used to reject charges that the mother’s approach to 
social inheritance (made-up) is questionable, by being able to place the blame on genetic 
inheritance (made) instead.  
The power of moral discourses of poor motherhood is difficult to usurp, even by 
medicine. While the mothers may feel absolved via the notion of fate or bad luck, this does 
not guarantee that others around them will feel the same. They are likely to still have to 
defend their moral worth.  
 
Conclusion 
The potential discovery that a child’s genetic variation is a product of a new mutation during 
fertilization or pregnancy does not end the dilemmas over inheritance. There is still a 
question mark placed on what this means for the future of the kinship-line in the presence of 
this new molecular oddity. Furthermore, it can still lead to new troubling stories being told 
about a family’s immediate past and current identity. The narrative thread introducing 
genetics as ‘bad luck’ is then woven into existing disputes over the moral qualities of a 
family, their reproductive choices, and approaches to raising their children. This is because 
inheritance is embroiled in many claims and counter-claims over what are acceptable and 
unacceptable family forms and parental identities. The substance of contemporary kinship 
plays a role in evaluating the moral worth of kinship relations within a variety of forms. The 
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purity of DNA is one important marker, but this also sits alongside ways in which 
responsibilities to existing kin and to future members are framed around who should enter the 
world and how they should be nurtured to develop into good citizens.  
We live, those of us in Western contexts, in uneven and contradictory contexts of 
multiple forms of family, which are removed from biological connection and sit alongside 
new scientific possibilities to classify the molecular make-up of families and their members. 
One could argue that there are signs that broader social norms around what are morally 
appropriate forms of family formation are becoming more expansive and imaginative. For 
example, the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 removed the clause 
requiring IVF clinics to consider the ‘need’ for a father when providing treatment and allows 
for a lesbian partner or other adult to be named as the second parent on a birth certificate. 
However, as our analysis demonstrates, the relief people find in realizing their DNA is not 
responsible for their child’s problems, alongside the relief others also find in attributing those 
problems to genetic bad luck rather than their own actions and behavior, point to the 
continued lived reality of significant social policing around which families are worthy and 
legitimate. It also points to the complex, diverse, and often contradictory responses available 
to families in their work to bring kinship back into the frame, regardless of the medical 
redefinitions made available to them through genetics. 
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